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Would-be authoritarians often turn to apex courts at some point throughout the
process of democratic erosion. Rather than packing them with loyalists, autocrats
can also resort to stealth forms of co-optation. In Brazil, Bolsonaro lacks the
necessary support in Congress to pass constitutional amendments. After numerous
judicial defeats in the past couple of months, Bolsonaro chose to travel down the
path of intimidation and defiance rather than institutional reform: Through dubious
constitutional interpretation, he and his supporters are ascribing to the armed forces
the role of a "constitutional moderator" in order to undermine the independence of
the Supreme Court.
Bolsonaro’s Dalliance with the Military
President Bolsonaro’s involvement with the military is nothing new. A former army
captain himself, Bolsonaro does not conceal his appraisal for the military dictatorship
that ruled the country for decades after the 1964 coup. The Brazilian "red scare"
prompted a regime based on torture, fundamental rights restrictions, and extra-
judicial killings.
In 1999, Bolsonaro said that nothing will change in Brazil through democratic means
and that real transformation will only be achieved when "we do the work that the
military regime refrained from doing, killing some thirty thousand people [in a civil
war]". At a time when Brazil just surpassed thirty thousand deaths due to COVID-19,
no one can claim ignorance towards his authoritarian aspirations.
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, Bolsonaro attended multiple rallies where
demonstrators called for the closure of Congress and the Brazilian Supreme Court
(STF), mimicking the actions taken at the overture of the dictatorship in the 1960s.
In addition, Bolsonaro changed his Health Minister twice during the COVID-19
pandemic. The Ministry is now run by General Eduardo Pazuello, who appointed
nine members of the Armed Forces to the Ministry’s staff. This configuration was
nicknamed by some a "Milistery" due to the unusually high number of military
personnel.
Currently nine out of twenty-two of Bolsonaro’s Ministers are linked to some extent
to the armed forces, including General Pazuello. That bring us to a total of 40,9% of
Ministries that are now headed by members of the armed forces.
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Supreme Defiance
The antidemocratic protests in Brazil are fueled in part by recent Supreme Court
rulings that represent major defeats for Bolsonaro. The President has been
downplaying the pandemic since the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in the
national territory. According to Bolsonaro, the disease that killed over 370 thousand
people worldwide is just "a little flu" and a "media trick".
Bolsonaro’s unparalleled stubbornness prompted local level authorities into action.
Although the President fiercely attacked governors that opted to impose regional and
local lockdown orders in response to the pandemic, 25 out of 27 states kept them
in place regardless of the President’s opposition. Bolsonaro argued that States and
Municipalities in Brazil could not act independently.
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court. Justice Marco Aurélio issued
a provisional order recognizing the joint competence of the Union, States, and
Municipalities in the area of public health. The decision empowered local authorities
to declare lockdown orders without the federal government’s acquiescence.
When Bolsonaro created a piece of propaganda named "Brazil can’t stop", a lower
federal court judge in Rio de Janeiro prohibited the federal government from using
the piece to advertise against social isolation on social media platforms. Justice
Barroso, later affirming the lower court’s decision, said that "it is the duty of the Union
to adequately inform the public about the circumstances that can endanger their
lives, health, and safety".
Moreover, Justice Alexandre de Moraes rejected Bolsonaro’s request to extend
the validity of presidential decrees during the coronavirus pandemic. In Brazil,
the President can issue provisional acts (medidas provisórias) to regulate urgent
matters, but the decree needs to be approved by a majority in Congress within
120 days to remain in force. The Court, nonetheless, decided that an extension
of the constitutional deadline would amount to an undue encroachment over the
legislature’s law making powers.
Moraes was involved in another major setback for the federal government. On April
24, Justice Minister Sérgio Moro (known for his role in the Car Wash operation)
resigned and accused Bolsonaro of politicizing the Federal Police. According
to Moro, the President was pushing for a change in the Police’s leadership. His
objective, Moro said, was to aid his sons and close friends who were implicated in
ongoing investigations.
After Moro’s resignation, Bolsonaro appointed Alexandre Ramagem, a family friend
and former head of the Brazilian Agency of Intelligence, to be the next head of the
Federal Police. Nevertheless, Justice Moraes barred the appointment over evidence
that Bolsonaro was trying to co-opt the institution.
Another blow came when Justice Celso de Mello authorized an investigation into
the President’s actions and decided to release the recording of a cabinet meeting
in which Bolsonaro admits that he is trying to politically interfere with the workings
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of the Federal Police. At one point in the meeting Bolsonaro said to his Ministers
that he is not going to "wait for [his] family or friends to get screwed [by police
investigations]" before taking action.
Summoning the Armed Forces
As the judicial defeats were piling up, Bolsonaro started to attack the Justices and
call for his supporters to protest against the Court for allegedly overstepping its
constitutional bounds. Bolsonaristas (Bolsonaro’s supporters) started to evoke Article
2 of the Brazilian Constitution, according to which the three branches of government
are "independent and harmonious with each other". They believe that the STF is
a threat to the independence and harmony between the branches and should be
restrained accordingly.
But Bolsonaro’s supporters did not stop there. They are now defending a purported
"constitutional role" that was reserved by the Constitution to the armed forces
when a conflict emerges between the three branches of government. Article 142
of the Constitution states that the armed forces are to "guarantee the constitutional
branches of government and, on the initiative of any of these branches, law and
order".
Bolsonaristas argue that the Constitution, under Article 142, delegates to the
armed forces the role of a "constitutional moderator" that can be summoned by
the President to reestablish law and order when the Supreme Court goes astray.
However, nothing in the Constitution tells how this "moderation" is to take place or
what is the mechanism through which any branch of government can summon the
armed forces.
The lack of clarity in the constitutional text did not stop Bolsonaro and his cronies
from advertising Article 142 as a solution to the stalemate between the Executive
and the Judiciary, in a clear attempt at giving legal legitimacy to their authoritarian
aspirations. In case the Supreme Court ventures too far off its constitutionally
prescribed path, the Justices are reminded that the armed forces will be ready to
intervene and restore the constitutional status quo.
In sum, bolsonaristas created a new constitutional emergency provision out of whole
cloth. When the system of checks and balances devised to keep the separation of
powers in place fails, the armed forces should intermediate institutional conflicts.
Nevertheless, there is no good reason to believe that the 1988 Constitution created
any additional checks beyond the structural limits provided by the separation of
powers and the Madisonian checks and balances.
It is unthinkable that a Constitution that was established to repudiate the military
dictatorship would provide for the possibility of the armed forces to assume such
a prominent role on the national stage without any further elucidations. But this
ludicrous thesis is supported by Ives Gandra Martins, a respected Professor of Law
in Brazil. In 2013, Martins said during a speech that there was no dictatorship in
Brazil, but instead a continuous "state of exception". He also argued that he and his
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colleagues were not censored during the period, shrugging off allegations of undue
censorship.
Martins' interpretation of Article 142 was adopted by bolsonaristas and the President
himself. On May 21, federal deputy Bia Kicis defended a "constitutional military
intervention" to restrain the Supreme Court. In her speech, which was aired live from
Congress, Kicis quoted Martins to argue that the Brazilian Constitution allows for the
armed forces to interfere with national politics with the objective of restoring law and
order.
More recently, on May 28, Bolsonaro shared a video on Twitter in which Martins
voices his antidemocratic interpretation of Article 142. According to the President,
the intervention will be "punctual" and is justified by the Supreme Court’s growing
"politicization". On June 2, the Prosecutor General Augusto Aras said during an
interview that the armed forces can step up when one branch encroaches upon
the other. According to Aras, if one of the branches invades the competencies of
another, it does not deserve the protection of the Armed Forces.
Although Ives Gandra Martins later wrote an op-ed saying that he favors democracy
and does not support a military coup, his unfortunate remarks continue to be shared
on social media by bolsonaristas, top officials in the federal government, and the
President to justify their antidemocratic agenda.
But the most warning sign came when General Augusto Heleno, the head of
the Institutional Security Cabinet in the Bolsonaro administration, signed a brief
statement in which he wrote that the actions of the Supreme Court are a "clear
attempt at imperiling the harmony between the branches and it can lead to
unforeseen consequences for the national stability".
Make or Break
When he was a presidential candidate, Bolsonaro threatened to create additional
seats in the Supreme Court. Now that he lacks the votes in Congress to do that, the
President is embracing an abusive interpretation of Article 142. Although the path
to formal institutional change is blocked, Bolsonaro can still count on key figures
in the military to bring the Court to its knees. Without the support of Congress and
unable to change the Court’s institutional features, Bolsonaro is trying to give the
armed forces the status of a fourth branch of government, one that can serve his
authoritarian project.
What we see in this unusual interpretation of Article 142 is what we call in Brazil
a "constitutional mutation" (a change in meaning without a corresponding change
in text) that is being used as a mechanism to erode the democratic order from the
inside out. From this point of view, the armed forces can interfere with the separation
of powers if one of the branches is not functioning "the right way".
Justice Celso de Mello will retire in November 2020, Bolsonaro will be able to
appoint a new member to the bench. The president’s promise is that he will select
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someone "terribly evangelical". In 2021, Justice Marco Aurélio de Mello will also
retire. The President suggested he could nominate the current Prosecutor General,
Augusto Aras, for a possible third vacancy at the Court, stating that "[he] hopes that
no one will disappear" until then, meaning the other Justices of the STF.
If Bolsonaro can show that the Constitution allows for an intervention of the armed
forces to "moderate" the struggle between the Presidency and the Court, his
authoritarian project can go forward without the need for amending the Constitution.
Thus, what we see in Brazil is not an ordinary debate over the correct interpretation
of the constitutional text. Instead, an abusive interpretation of Article 142 is advanced
at the expense of democratic stability.
Brazil has not had a formal "constitutional moderator" since the Imperial Constitution
of 1824, when the task was performed by the emperor. It was later abolished by
the first Republican Constitution of 1891, which adopted the supremacy of the
Constitution as a criterion for establishing (and keeping) the balance between the
branches of government. This prerogative cannot be restored and entrusted to the
armed forces without prompting a democratic breakdown.
Article 142 needs to be interpreted alongside other hallmarks of Brazilian
constitutionalism. The 1988 Constitution represents a rupture with the military
regime. From a democratic perspective, it did not entrust the task of keeping the
harmony between the branches to the armed forces. Instead, the separation of
powers is structurally enforced by a system of checks and balances that do not
require tanks or machine guns.
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